

# COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE



newsletter

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In this month's Newsletter we pass along some correspondence and discussions concerning several themes developed in past issues, as well as beginning, with Alvin W. Wolfe's discussion of American involvement in the African crisis, what we hope will be a series of analyses of forthcoming crises. Professor Maurice Stein, the sociologist at Brandeis University, in his efforts to help get a Boston Area Committee of Correspondence underway, thought at one point of calling the effort the Crisis of the Month Club. He later felt this would be both too reactive and not reactive enough, and said we should operate on three levels: crisis of the week, crisis of the month, and crisis of the year. The whole idea was subsequently dropped as too hard on the nerves, but it sticks in my mind as a reasonable approach to the times and a fair description of the mood of people associated with this Committee. As for the crisis of the week, many of us have also tried to ease our nation through past crises by direct action: through Washington channels if we have an entree there, and through ads in the newspapers, letters to editors and Congressmen, pickets and demonstrations and speaking engagements if we do not. The Newsletter itself has been pretty much an organ of the crisis of the month; and one might call our concern for the general problems of American response the crisis of the year approach. Stein, however, meant that

phrase also to connote an attempt to anticipate crises, just as Erich Fromm in May Man Prevail? describes the need for anticipatory rather than catastrophic change. We have been short on this, and I hope that Alvin Wolfe's discussion will provoke more analyses of problem areas that receive little attention before they explode.

At the end of the issue we do something else we hope we can expand in the future: that is, we pass along some proposals. They are a small beginning, but the political, or rather the sub-political situation in this country is exciting and full of potential for the first time in many years. New organizations are being formed, conferences being called, quasi-political action groups being proposed and discussed. We hope in future issues to report more fully on these several developments, such as Turn Toward Peace, and Leo Szilard's current attempt to find grass roots support for a Washington lobby, and the conference projected for June at the University of Rochester, the prospectus for which is so surprisingly radical; and on such organiz-



zation as the Peace Research Institute. Most of these are still in the discussion stage, and a report would be premature at this point, but there are many similar signs of promise. One other thing we would like to do: to print regularly a list of who among our readers is working on a paper or a project that might be helpful to others of us similarly engaged. Please send such information to the editorial office, Emerson Hall 324, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.

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Roger Hagan

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Alvin W. Wolfe.

#### AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFRICAN CRISIS

While the eyes of cold-war conscious America are on Berlin, Laos, the veteran "off-shore" islands, or other locations where a war could start by accident, few are looking seriously at the African situation where war is almost inevitable. Africa is moving steadily, if not plunging, toward an arrangement of forces such that their violent clash is highly predictable. When this occurs the United States will be involved, despite public demurrers that the problems of Africa are to be left to Africans and Europeans to resolve. Americans may soon find themselves in Africa forcefully supporting three principles that all their traditions call them to condemn: colonialism, racism, and an irresponsible, non-free enterprise type of capitalism.

It may well be too late to save the situation in Africa, to prevent such a senseless war and the attendant chaos from which only Communism could benefit. The lines are drawn and they begin to converge. If there is any hope, it lies in understanding the dimensions of the African crisis and



and in clarifying the American position, in policy and in action.

#### The Dimensions of the African Crisis

Three points of contention are at the heart of the problem of Africa: contention over independence for Africans, contention over the dominance of white settlers in Africa, and contention over control of the vast mineral resources. None of these is a new problem, but each is achieving greater importance in the lives of those affected by it. More important, for Africa as a whole and for the world, the three conflicts, once dispersed both geographically and politically, are now coming to a spatial focus and becoming unidimensional in a political sense. Geographically, the focus is on Africa south of the equator, for the African territories to the north have achieved their independent status, have few white settlers, and have considerably less mineral resources for which European corporations will fight. Politically, the forces contending are aligning themselves as they had not done historically: Colonialists (for example, the Portuguese) making common cause with Racists (for example, the Afrikaners) making common cause with the important Capitalists (for example, corporations in Rhodesia and Katanga). It must be apparent to each of these that they have become mutually dependent in the cul de sac formed by the southern part of Africa. On the other side, from the African point of view, the more closely capitalist corporations identify themselves with governments of white supremacy and colonialism the more attentive will be the 150,000,000 independent Africans to voices that call upon them to drive all Europeans out of all of Africa.

#### Independence vs. Colonialism

While some observers cite dissension among the newly independent nations in support of the theory that Africans will never unite to "liberate their brothers," it is nonetheless true that no African government, not even the most conservative, will be secure until all Africans are politically independent of European control. Because of the history of slave trade and colonialism (and we dare not overlook how dark was that period in history) the fear of continued European domination can always be used by any politician in Africa against a government which tends to maintain close ties with European powers. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and other states are committed to the fight to free all Africans, and they will use whatever means, including subversion, to achieve that goal. Some of the states, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroun, for example, tend to put their own economic development above the independence of Africa as a political issue, but the latter is potentially important in their own lands. If present governments do not use this political weapon, their opposition will.

Angola and Mozambique are controlled by Portugal; Southwest Africa is controlled by the Union of South Africa; the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, though hardly comparable to the other cases, lie technically under the British Colonial Office. So long as these vast areas of colonialism remain, political tensions will mount in Africa. What African nation could have normal relations with Portugal or the Union?

#### White Supremacy vs. African Domination

The second conflict is closely related to the first: What is to be done about the white settlers in Africa? Apart from the Union, which is a special case, settled populations of European origin are found only in



those areas that are not yet independent, a correlation more than coincidental. Kenya, Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, Angola, Mozambique, and Southwest Africa all have a small minority white population. The Congo, with something like half-independence, has the problem of white residents, now half in and half out. Kenya and Tanganyika will be independent in a matter of months, with governments dominated by African majorities. The whites in Rhodesia, in the Portuguese territories, and in that bleakest of all nations, the Union of South Africa, show no evidence of willingly yielding their power to Africans. In these territories, the Africans will achieve political power only by fighting for it. When this occurs, the 4,000,000 whites might defend themselves against the 30,000,000 Africans if the Africans have no arms. Those few million whites would have to be backed by the Portuguese Army, already committed to the fight to keep Angola Portuguese, and by the European mining corporations whose lucrative rights to exploitation they owe to European-controlled governments.

### Conflict over Control of Mineral Wealth

This problem is the most complicated of the three lines of contention in Africa; it is least understood and yet it is the most serious as a threat to the peace of the whole world. For it is in defense of the "rights" of private corporations that the United States and Great Britain will commit forces to the African continent--but they will have to defend Salazar and Verwoert at the same time. It is of utmost importance that these "rights" be investigated: In what do they consist? How were they acquired? What is their effect on the lands and people they involve? How do they relate to the ideology of "free enterprise" or "democratic capitalism" or whatever the Western system is called?

The wealth in gold and diamonds of the southern tip of Africa is by now legendary. And the area of southern Katanga and Northern Rhodesia has been called by geologists a 'geological monstrosity'--so rich is it in all the most ancient and most modern of minerals. The list is long: copper, coal, diamonds, tin, zinc, cobalt, cadmium, palladium, gold, uranium, and on and on. In the same area are ample water resources to develop hydroelectric power that could make this one of the world's industrial centers. Though all this is in Africa, it is not seen as belonging to Africans. Mineral rights in Africa were given to Europeans by Europeans. If there was any quid pro quo, the company involved was to undertake the administration and control of the African populations in exchange for the rights of exploitation. Whenever contracts have been renegotiated so that the private companies have yielded certain rights to territorial governments the governments have been white governments --again, Europeans granting to Europeans. Nowhere south of the equator has any control of mineral rights been returned to Africans.

### Minerals and Power: the Case of the Congo

The mineral wealth of southern Africa makes it unlikely that those who now control it will easily give it up to Africans. The Congo provides an illustrative case that has in it all the elements of the more general conflict in southern Africa.

To understand the problem, we must go back to the period subsequent to the Berlin Conference of 1885. The International Association of the Congo, a private business venture directed by King Leopold of the Belgians, had been recognized as a government under the title of Congo Independent State. But what were its borders? One of the conditions



agreed upon in Berlin was that claims to African territory had to be enforced by effective administration and control. How could Leopold's private business enterprise compete for territory under those conditions against whole nations with armies to enforce control and battalions of bureaucrats to set up administration over vast territories? Undaunted, Leopold devised a scheme. The capital necessary to expand his political control to the whole of the Congo Basin could be obtained from private sources in return for grants of exclusive rights of exploitation. Leopold could do the high-level negotiation from Brussels while some private company could do the work of controlling the natives and exploiting the resources. The profit, of course, would be shared. Thus, to handle the vast area between Lake Tanganyika and the Kasai River Leopold signed an agreement with the Katanga Company, itself a joint company involving both the Société Générale de Belgique and a Rhodes subsidiary, Tanganyika Concessions Limited. Within a few years the copper began to pay off, and by 1905, when the Union Minière corporation was set up by this combine, the expansion of the enterprise was well underway, using, of course, the labor of Africans who had to be forced to work.

In 1908, after international investigations exposed the atrocious way in which Leopold operated his business and government combine, the Belgian government took over its administration. The Congo Independent State became the Belgian Congo. With a responsible government in control --that is, responsible to a real European nation, though of course still with little responsibility to any African population--the atrocities and the outright slavery were much reduced. Prestation labor was not stopped, however; nor was the fundamental structure of the government or economy of the Congo changed. During the process of expansion of industrial corporations, the government share of profits diminished somewhat, but even up to the end of Belgian control, the Belgian Congo Government owned approximately one-fifth of the capital stock of the mineral-exploiting companies. In 1958, just fifty years after the Belgian assumption of control, Belgian financial interests were reported to be 3-1/2 billion dollars, 220 million of that being held in the Belgian Congo Government portfolio. This stock was voted by the Minister of Colonies of Belgium, who had, of course, to have the approval of the King as well as of the Belgian government. Special note should be made of the extent of interaction between government and business in Belgium and especially in the Congo, for Americans who make much over the separation of powers, especially "keeping government out of business," sometimes have the impression that American ways are the ways of all mankind. Big Business and Big Government were completely united in the Belgian Congo: Government held stock in private enterprise and guaranteed that those enterprises would have no competition; what was good for Business was good for the Belgian Congo government.

But what was good for the Belgian Congo government was not all that good for the Congolese. While great profits were taken by the corporations, even over and beyond internally-financed expansion, the per capita income of the Congolese was at about \$75 a year. This while the potential growth rate of the Congo economy was tremendous: in the terms employed by W. W. Rostow in his Stages of Economic Growth, the Congo economy was ready for the "Take-off" stage, with a very high rate of capital formation relative to gross national product. At \$75 a year, however, not many Congolese capitalists were prepared to invest in this great private enterprise. Exports in 1958 amounted to 415 million dollars while the Congo imported only 359 million dollars worth of goods. Thus there was not much for the Congolese to consume, even if they had the money to buy.



Even more noteworthy, from the point of view of development: despite all the mining activity there for seventy years, not one single Congolese was educated as a mining engineer.

One might still have the impression, after what has been said, that there was some degree of free enterprise among the private corporations operating in the Congo. If this be the case, it is instructive to look at the corporate structure. We may begin with the tentacles of the Société Générale de Belgique, a large Belgian holding company with two major subsidiary holding companies in the Congo, Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (C.C.C.I), and Profrigo. The Société Générale itself holds the controlling interest in a number of major operating firms, among which are: 1) Forminière, which has exclusive rights to diamond mining in the Kasai, and which was the company that backed Albert Kalonji in setting up the so-called "Mining State of South Kasai" as an independent state seceded from the Congo; 2) Géomines, which has exclusive tin mining rights in northern Katanga, whose mines, processing plants, and rail lines at Manono and Kabalo were in the news when they were recaptured for the company in early 1961, when the white mercenary army of Katanga made its drive into north Katanga burning Baluba villages along the way; 3) Bécéka, which owns and operates most of the railroads in Katanga and Kasai, over which minerals and supplies pass between Elisabethville and anywhere, whether they go out over the Port Francqui line toward Leopoldville or over the Benguela line through Portuguese Angola; 4) Cotonco, which under Belgian rule was licensed to buy and process the cotton Congolese were forced to grow in a program called "prestation agriculture."

Even this truncated list gives some indication of the monopolistic structure of the Congo economy. But note has hardly been taken of the one company most people have heard something about--Union Minière, mentioned previously as having been founded in 1905 as the copper-mining arm of the combine formed by Leopold's Congo Independent State, the Société Générale de Belgique, and Tanganyika Concessions Limited. Union Minière has grown to astounding proportions, and has numerous sizable subsidiaries, among which are: 1) Metalkat, operating the coal and zinc mines in Katanga; 2) Sogelec, operating the hydroelectric power system; 3) Sogechim, chemical processing; 4) Sogefor, operating in the agricultural field; and 5) African Metals Corporation, handling American purchases.

Lest the notion be conveyed that there could be some competition among the three major corporations, Union Minière, the Société Générale, and Tanganyika Concessions Limited, it must be pointed out that the two latter enjoy substantial overlapping in their boards of directors, including Messrs. E. Van der Straeten, H. Robiliart, and A. de Spirlet, so that neither is likely to harm the other; further, six of the directors of Tanganyika Concessions Limited sit on the Union Minière board and five directors of the Société Générale are also directors of Union Minière. There is much more to be said about the interlocking of all the major corporations operating in this part of Africa, but insofar as the Congo is concerned the security of European control over the economy is demonstrated as simply as that. It has been said that some Congolese (from Katanga, of course) have been "elevated" to the Board of Directors of Union Minière--imagine what influence their convictions could have on their "colleagues" from Société Générale de Belgique and from Tanganyika Concessions Limited. One should not be surprised to hear of the institution of a program to educate Africans for positions as high as mining



engineers! Knowledge of the financial structure makes ludicrous such reports as that of an American correspondent in Katanga: "Observers here say that it is Mr. Tshombe who runs Union Minière in Katanga--and not vice-versa" (Benjamin Welles, New York Times, March 19, 1961). Surely the American press cannot report with a straight face that such financial giants as Charles Waterhouse and Harry Oppenheimer, Britons, and Paul Gillet and P. Bonvoisin, Belgians, would let a little African politician steal a billion-dollar business from them!

What actually happened as the Congo came to independence has never been fully reported. Many of the facts will remain forever secret, but some piecing together of snatches of information reveals a great deal. The Belgian Congo government, it will be recalled, had interest in various ways in all the corporations registered in the Congo (including of course the province of Katanga). It held capital stock of the mining companies, including Union Minière; it levied corporate income taxes; and it collected royalties on minerals extracted. Thus, a company as large as Union Minière contributed significantly to the Treasury of the Belgian Congo: roughly \$60,000,000 of the \$140,000,000 annual budget.

The directors of the Société Générale could fairly easily call the tune for Union Minière so long as the third major bloc of stock (i.e. other than their own and that of Tanganyika Concession Limited) was controlled by Belgians, in the name of the government of the Belgian Congo. That stock, reputed to be approximately one-fifth of that outstanding, would normally have devolved to the government of the Republic of the Congo upon independence. Hoping to get a government friendly to their interests, the directors of the Société Générale backed Tshombe's Conakat party, which subsequently won only a few seats in the national assembly where Lumumba's MNC party won more than three times as many as its nearest opponent. Lumumba became the head of the national government and pressure was put on him to accept one of Tshombe's men as Minister of Economic Affairs--undoubtedly with an eye to that Union Minière and other interesting voting stock in the portfolio of the Republic.

Lumumba did grant the Conakat party the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but he hedged somewhat by creating a new ministry parallel to it, the Ministry of Economic Coordination and Planning. It was then, it may be presumed, that the directors of the Société Générale decided that the Lumumba government would never have the chance to vote the stock. Within a month, Katanga had seceded, financed with funds that should legally have gone to the Treasury of the Central Government, through the Banque Centrale in Leopoldville. Though this was going on as early as July and August 1960, not until January 1961 was it publicly announced that the dividend payments on stock of Union Minière had been paid to the Katanga Treasury. Although the necessary information concerning other companies subsidiary to the Société Générale is unavailable, it may be assumed that this stock, too, was taken from the Central Government and given to Katanga, or in the case of Forminière possibly to the somewhat tenuous government of the "Mining State of South Kasai." However, stock certificates are not effective unless the real property is also controlled. Thus, in February and March 1961, the Katanga Army led by white officers recruited from Europe and southern Africa were sent north from Elisabethville to take over the mines and railways of the Géomines Corporation, for these were still held by troops loyal to the Central Government or at least not loyal to Tshombe and the Société Générale de Belgique.



The European financiers appear well in command despite all the problems. After several abortive attempts to resolve the Congo situation by some sort of articles of confederation peacefully agreed upon to bring Katanga back into relation with the rest of Congo, the United Nations, already weakened in a variety of ways, made its vain attempt to force an end to the secession. Again, Katanga forces, well-equipped and financed by the corporation profits that should have been going to the Central Government, went into action. The result was inconclusive: Some lives were lost, but corporate profits were unaffected. The United Nations lost military positions and it lost prestige; the United Nations lost its Secretary-General and it lost direction. By October the United Nations had agreed it would not try to stop the Katanga provincial forces from fighting the government forces. On all sides, international law is breaking down. Katanga, though officially recognized as an independent state by no nation in the world, is authorized to equip an army and air force financed by giant private corporations controlled by persons not even resident in Africa, let alone Katanga. The neighboring Federation of Rhodesia, constitutionally prohibited from managing its own foreign affairs, steals out from under British control by publicly supporting the Katanga secession and by condemning the United Nations and all nations supporting its action. Success of the Katanga secession means continued European control in that area, and Prime Minister Welensky of Rhodesia knows full well that he depends upon the same financial sources as those at stake in Katanga. Tanganyika Concessions Limited ties in with Rhodesian Anglo American Limited and with Rhokana Corporation and with Anglo American Corporation of South Africa and with De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa and with the British South Africa Company and with the Roan Antelope Copper Mines Limited, and on and on. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer is one important man whose portfolio easily enfolds all these fantastically powerful corporations. So long as jet planes and their pilots can be bought these corporations will have the money to buy them. Just as Verwoerd must fear to yield one vote in South Africa and Salazar fears to yield one hectare in Portuguese Africa, the European corporations must fear to yield one dollar, franc, or pound sterling in their realm. This is the stuff of which revolutions are made.

#### The American Position in Africa

The United States has never in history had a set policy with respect to Africa. Nevertheless, American impact has been felt on an ad hoc basis. During the period when the British navy was attempting to halt the slave trade, the United States refused to permit the British to search ships flying the American flag. As a result, slavers of all nations, especially Portuguese, flew the Stars and Stripes; and the slave trade was prolonged proportionately. Later, when Liberia was struggling to maintain its independence, American action, even through the Firestone Company, was effective.

In 1884, when France, Portugal, England and Germany were in contention over the Congo Basin and adjacent areas, the United States, for reasons still obscure, voluntarily recognized Leopold's International Association of the Congo as a government, thereby forcing the hand of the European nations, who then acceded to Leopold's establishment of what was euphemistically called the Congo Independent State. Even more,



the United States had as a consultant to its delegation at the Berlin Conference none other than Henry Morton Stanley who was clearly working for King Leopold at the very same time. While there was no announced policy on African Affairs, the United States has not been without effect on that continent.

More recently, national policy could have been expressed in votes in the United Nations. But for many years American governments chose the route of abstention on African issues-- on colonialism generally, on Algeria, on Southwest Africa, on Portuguese Africa. Up to a point, this attempt to avoid the issue did no great damage to the American reputation. Africans believed the United States to be ultimately anti-colonial, in favor of liberty and self-determination. African political leaders have all frequently cited Jefferson, Paine, Henry, and Lincoln, and have quoted them approvingly. Also, American missionaries, despite many errors of judgment and understanding, have for the most part left a good impression on Africans among whom they have worked in colonial territories. Certainly this latter is an important factor explaining the high regard in which America was held by Congolese at the time of their independence.

It was not surprising to those who knew something about the Congo to see Premier Lumumba turn first, and immediately, without hesitation, to the United States for aid when the Belgian paratroopers began streaming back into his country upon the occasion of the riots in July 1960. He was, of course, rebuffed, and the shock he felt must have been the greater because he had such high expectations. It was then that he turned to the United Nations and, shortly thereafter, to the Russians to help him keep the Belgians out.

In the many debates and behind-the-scenes maneuvers concerning the Congo in the United Nations organization, the American role was frequently to delay and to temper positive action while the situation in the Congo grew more and more critical. Even while willing to pay almost the entire cost of the U. N. operation, the United States did not want to take any positive action that would be seen as opposition to NATO allies who still had colonies.

The American Embassy in the Congo was always active, however, and it has been reported in newspapers that Ambassador Timberlake was the very first foreign ambassador to dignify the secession of Katanga by making an official visit--an act reminiscent of America's being the first to recognize Leopold's business corporation as a government in 1884. It has been reported, too, that the American Military Attaché in Leopoldville had had frequent discussions with Colonel Mobutu immediately prior to his coup d'etat and his dissolution of the government and the parliament in early September 1960. Certainly, it is a fact that within ten days after this military coup the United States Government brought eleven of Mobutu's "officers" to the United States for a "tour of the Pentagon and other military establishments." Whatever that meant in terms of military affairs, it had an important political effect--it showed everyone concerned that the United States supported the Mobutu regime. All this while the whole world, America included, continuously called for no unilateral intervention and demanded that the United Nations not take sides, even to support the legitimate government as against Mobutu's obviously illegitimate force.



American actions and inactions with regard to the Congo have in general had the effect of permitting the European financial interests to maintain control in a situation where there was for a period some doubt that they would be able to. The case of Tshombe in Katanga is too obvious to need mentioning. During the several months succeeding the secession of Katanga, the Belgian interests were represented there by none other than Count Aspremont-Linden, Aide-de-Camp to the King of the Belgians. Mobutu, too, undoubtedly had the support of the financial interests, for while Lumumba's legitimate government had found it impossible to get the money to meet the army payrolls-- and hence always had a hungry, rebellious force to control--the Banque Centrale, controlled by Belgians, advanced the necessary money to Mobutu for this purpose. Who was behind the teller's window may never be known. It is possible that it was the Société Générale de Belgique, for Mobutu and Tshombe have since proven to be in considerable agreement. Their armies may yet merge to control the whole Congo.

The Kennedy Administration has given no evidence of changing the American policy on the Congo, but there have been two recent occasions when the United States voted properly on other colonial issues: the vote against the Union of South Africa on the issue of Southwest Africa, and the mild vote against Portugal on the issue of Angola.

Events in Africa are developing so rapidly toward the kind of horrible prospect suggested earlier, that much more than resolutions of mild disapproval are necessary even to attempt to save the situation. "Save the situation" means to establish conditions in which the Africans and the white settlers and the foreign investors can all benefit, without exploiting African people or lands irresponsibly, without driving all whites out, and without driving all European capital investment out.

Peaceful resolution of these conflicts demands that the United States, as the Giant of the West, apply great pressure on Portugal and on the Union of South Africa and on the international corporations operating in the Congo. We are far from ready to do this. The Wall Street Journal and other influential newspapers have been highly critical of the present Administration for such slight evidences of "pro-African" positions as those recently voted in the U.N. Far from America's applying any sort of pressure on the Union of South Africa for its extremely unfair and brutal apartheid policy, American business relations with that nation have been increasing. Business with all of Africa increased in the past year, but over half of the increase was in trade with the Union. And one reads with horror that gasoline bombs with which the Portuguese levelled Angolan villages were stamped "Property of United States Air Force". Still, American jingoists, now "gung-ho NATO," continuously berate African neutrals for not rallying to support the West in Berlin, of all places!

It is highly doubtful that the American public will awaken in time to support the right principles in the African conflict. While the racist propaganda of the South African government finds relatively few receptive ears in America, the rich voices of the European corporations are beginning to come through. Stand by the great corporations, they call, and we will save Africans from communism. Even the Katanga secession is being por-



trayed as a legitimate search on the part of Africans for self-determination. The white mercenaries and the white board of directors belie that claim easily.

Harry Oppenheimer has recently been purchasing sizeable advertising space to present himself and his companies as honest, free-enterprising liberals who believe in equal opportunity for people of all colors. However full of compassion he may be, one must wonder how a man who is on the Board of Directors of the British South Africa Company, Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Rhodesian Anglo-American Limited, Rhokana Corporation Limited, Tanganyika Concessions Limited, and so on, can possibly have gone on these many years permitting the ruthless exploiting of African lands and peoples when he could have forced the hand of any government to adopt a more liberal policy. Imagine what the history of Angola would have been if Oppenheimer and his colleagues had used their ownership of Angola's main source of revenue, the Benguela Railway, to get the Portuguese to relax their oppression. Or Rhodesia might have been an independent, multi-racial, highly-developed nation had Oppenheimer and his colleagues used their power in that direction. Instead they tried to insure white control, politically and economically, and to get the United States government to help them keep it that way. The U. S. Export-Import Bank recently made a \$20,000,000 loan to their Rhodesia-Congo Border Power Company. Some notion of how much all this corporate development helps the African may be seen in the following statistics of De Beers Consolidated Mines: In 1959, with assets of 191,000,000 pounds sterling, the company employed only 4,508 Africans. What do they do for humanity? How do they deserve the right, preemptive right, to all diamonds on lands of the South West Africa Company and in all of Northern Rhodesia? How do they deserve the American loan of \$20,000,000 to build a power project when they could build that with the small change they get from the diamonds?

The Belgian corporations have been adding their voices to the call for American support. After years of trying to keep American businessmen out of the private Congo preserve, the Société Générale de Belgique now wants to attract Americans to it in order to enhance American interests there and ensure American support when it is needed, as needed it will be. In June 1961 a new corporation was established in the United States -- the Belgo-American Development Corporation--whose chairman and president is Alan G. Kirk, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired, former Ambassador to Belgium. Admiral Kirk is also on the Board of Directors of the Belgian-American Banking Corporation and the Belgian-American Bank and Trust Company, both of which are affiliated with the Société Générale de Belgique. Undoubtedly, it takes considerable administrative skill to develop in the halls of the government of the United States, spokesmen for foreign corporations. Katanga seems to be doing fairly well in the Senate, but the effort will be intensified.

This brief, but intense, look at the African crisis suggests that Africa is moving rapidly toward a climax, a violent conflict between Africans who want freedom and Europeans who want to maintain control. This means chaos from which only the Communists are likely to gain. America cannot remain on the sidelines longer, but it is now late for Americans to come to understand the African issue. The net of international finance is drawing the United States toward a commitment to defend European interests in Africa South, and those are diametrically opposed to African inter-



ests in an Africa Independent. Every African leader who tries to free his people from the political and economic bondage in which they now are held will be portrayed in America as a "Moscow-trained Marxist," while the monopolistic business structure of that part of Africa will be portrayed in America as a model of free enterprise. War may start in Berlin or in Laos; it can hardly be avoided in Africa.

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#### ON AMERICAN RESPONSE

Fred Warner Neal..

#### LIBERALS AND THE COLD WAR

(From a radio broadcast over KPFK - Los Angeles)

Our own policies have been based on an almost complete disregard of the basic principles of international politics, an almost complete ignorance of Soviet policies and an almost complete misunderstanding of the nature of Communism and its threat. Fundamentally, they have involved confusion between our understandable dislike of Communism, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. They have resulted in our attempt to "contain" Communism by pointing guns at the Soviet Union, by an almost complete reliance on military means.

Of course these policies have not succeeded.

Begun under the Democratic administration of Mr. Truman, they were continued under the Republican administration of Mr. Eisenhower. They may have been carried out a little more ineptly by the Republicans, and there was the disaster that the late Mr. Dulles was for six incredibly long years our secretary of state and dominated the Eisenhower Administration as far as foreign policy was concerned. But basically there was no difference. In neither the campaign of 1952 nor the campaign of 1956 did the Democrats propose anything fundamentally different from or even criticize the basis of our disastrous foreign policy. And the 1960 campaign was not very much different. As for the Kennedy Administration, there are some good omens and some bad omens. But one very serious factor is a high measure of confusion over foreign policy that comes from applying to it the terms "liberal" and "conservative". What counts with foreign policy is whether it works and whether it really serves the national interest, not whether it is "liberal" or "conservative" or advanced by "liberals" or "conservatives." There have been no greater supporters of the democratic-republican foreign policy, for example, than the Americans for Democratic Action, which is supposed to be a group of "liberal" Democrats. Indeed, the only group of "liberals" -- the only group of any kind, in fact -- which has faced up to the issue of foreign policy thus far is the California Democratic Council.



What happened to the other "liberals" in the Democratic Party, to the "eggheads," the intellectuals, who do, or who should, if anybody does, have the mental equipment to deal with foreign policies meaningfully and realistically? First is the fact that the liberal movement in the United States is vaguely infected by the ideological influence of European socialism. And this socialism, the socialism of the Second International, has always taken an exceedingly doctrinaire and emotional view of the Soviet Union. From a moral point of view, this opposition to totalitarianism is quite proper and understandable. From the practical political point of view of demanding that the Russians adopt Western democratic practices, it is futile and sometimes infantile. But when it is carried over into the realm of international politics in the form of refusing to deal with the Russians because of their internal practices and ideology, it is not only stupid but dangerous.

This intramural quarrel of socialism was not very significant in American liberalism for a long time; and in the period of U.S. and Soviet isolation, especially when Moscow appeared as the leading opponent of the Nazis, many American liberals took an overly sanguine view of the Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Finnish war disillusioned them temporarily, but when during World War II we were arrayed on the side of the Russians, the liberals and many others developed again a rosy view of the USSR that had nothing to do with the facts. When, once more, it became clear after the war that the Russians were not Western-style political democrats and had their own Soviet Communist ideas about post-war reorganization, the American liberals -- now joined by European socialists among the emigres -- flipfopped again to a point of all-out opposition.

I recall, for example, a conversation I had during the war with a liberal Democratic friend, now high in the Administration. He was holding forth on what was sometimes referred to as "the world coalition for democracy," meaning the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. I objected to this terminology, pointing out that the Soviet Union was not a democracy in our sense and was in fact opposed to our kind of democracy. My friend replied that this showed I did not understand the real nature of allied unity. But then, a few years later, this same man was denouncing Soviet totalitarianism and talking about a military danger from the Soviet Union. Again I objected, pointing out that the Soviet Union had always been totalitarian and that this did not necessarily mean Soviet military aggression. He this time replied that I did not understand the real nature of Communist totalitarianism.

Part of the trouble was, of course, that the liberals were confusing Soviet totalitarianism with Nazi totalitarianism. On top of this, the American liberals got mixed up between liberalism -- a vague concept at best -- and the Democratic Party. Under FDR's New Deal, the liberals had real political influence in the country for the first time, or thought they did anyway, and somehow they imagined that Mr. Truman was simply Roosevelt in another form and his administration a continuation of the New Deal. Thus when Mr. Truman's limited intellectual capacity and limited abilities of leadership, plus his susceptibility to military influences, got us started on the present disastrous foreign policy course, the liberals were, in a sense, entrapped. On top of this, they felt that they could now play a real political role.



This was the dream, for example, of the ADA. But to play a real political role, they reasoned, they had to be sure that they would not be tainted with being pro-Communist. Their way to avoid such a taint was to take a strong stand not only against Communism at home but also against the Soviet Union in foreign policy. These two things are not at all the same and the liberals became hopelessly enmeshed in their own contradictions. It must never be forgotten, for example, that what is widely known as "McCarthyism" began in connection with the loyalty oaths during the Truman Administration and particularly in the State Department under Dean Acheson.

So by the time the Cold War broke out, the liberals were firmly committed to it via the Truman Administration and played their own role in exacerbating it and its consequences. How did the Cold War start? It was not, of course, simply a matter of Soviet evil on one side versus American purity on the other. During the war both sides had underrated the latent mutual hostility between the two systems and had come to believe that there was mutual acceptance for each other's post-war ideas. For all of American history prior to World War II, and for all of Soviet history, these nations had been more or less isolationist. Suddenly, at the war's end, as a result of the consequences of the war, both appeared on the world stage at a moment when there was nobody else. Like a couple of unguided or misguided missiles, both the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other all over the world, in all their mutual ignorance and self-centeredness, neither prepared to be confronted by a real opponent. A good example of this is the case of the war-time agreements, especially Yalta, about which so much nonsense has been spouted. There can be little doubt that the nature of the war-time negotiations and agreements was such that the Russians quite sincerely believed that the United States and Great Britain had agreed to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. And the Americans and the British, although they may have agreed to this during the war, were quite unprepared for it in the form it took.

But the United States especially, I think, was unprepared for the kind of world that appeared after the war -- a world of rapid flux and change, a world quite different from the one we had been used to all of our national lives. The world we had been used to was essentially a world dominated by Western Europe and made safe for the United States primarily by the existence of the British Empire and the British Navy. This world didn't exist any more, and the old structure and shape were being challenged not only by the Soviet Union but by revolutionary forces, communist and nationalist but especially the latter, everywhere. Egged on by the British, now dominated by just those kind of doctrinaire socialists I mentioned earlier, the United States unconsciously tried -- and is still trying -- to do what might be called maintaining the British Empire in another form and by other means. One result of this has been that the United States, a nation conceived in revolution and verbally, at least, devoted to one of the most revolutionary concepts the world has ever known, has been in opposition to just about every revolutionary development that has appeared since the war. In most cases, if not in all, unsuccessfully.

Now out of all this arose the myth of the danger of Soviet military aggression. It is interesting to consider exactly when and how this myth gained concrete form. What was the situation at the war's end?



It was that the Soviet Union was prostrate with destruction and exhaustion wrought by the war. It had a large army, yes, but largely unmechanized and unmodernized. Its already inadequate industrial capacity was shattered. It had very little airpower. It had no navy. And it had no nuclear weapons. Against this, the United States emerged as the strongest nation in the history of the world. Its military-industrial capacity was enormous. Its air force controlled the skies. Its fleet controlled the seas. Together with our British allies, the United States possessed military bases virtually ringing the Soviet Union. And we and we alone had the atom bomb, developed and used without consulting our wartime Soviet allies and under conditions certainly likely to arouse, rather than allay, Soviet fears. Who, the man from Mars might well have asked, was a danger to whom?

Containment, the doctrine attributed to George Kennan -- and long since repudiated by him -- was more the expression of a policy already begun than a new policy in itself. Of course, in part, the idea of military danger from the USSR arose because of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It is quite true that the Russians did not act in Eastern Europe the way we wanted them to, but they were there not as a result of military aggression but as a result of having occupied the area in the process of defeating the Germans in World War II. It is also true that the Russians had, as always, almost paranoiac suspicions, that they were intransigent and difficult to deal with. On top of this was the revolutionary ferment in the world -- which was not instigated by the Russians or even, in this period, taken advantage of by them. The Truman Doctrine, of which so many Truman liberals are so proud, was aimed at saving Greece from Soviet aggression at a time when Stalin himself was opposing the Greek Communist revolution.

It was largely President Truman's doing that the idea of Soviet military aggression had become by this time so firmly implanted in the American mind. And this was -- it should be noted -- at the same time that the idea of American military aggression was being so firmly implanted in the Soviet mind.

The result was virtually no real diplomatic negotiations, in the sense that real negotiation involves compromise -- mutual compromise -- with the aim of reaching agreement. And this idea of Soviet military aggression still impedes real negotiations on our part. Now if this idea is correct -- if the Soviet Union is inevitably and by its very nature militarily aggressive -- then there can of course be no agreements with them. And without agreements with the Soviet Union, there can be no future for either of us. But regardless of the past, Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet view of the world have changed markedly since 1956. Our policy, off base to begin with, has hardly changed at all. What is needed now above everything else is a calm, dispassionate re-evaluation of our views of the Soviet Union in order to make a calm, dispassionate re-evaluation of our foreign policy, with the aim of more actively seeking arms control and disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union. That is what all Americans must hope the new administration will do. But Americans must do more than hope. They must use political pressure. And they must individually write letters and send telegrams and offer resolutions to let President Kennedy know that if he will be courageous enough to begin a shift in the direction of our foreign policy he will have at least some backing in the country.



Robert Paul Wolff

### ASSESSING THE SOVIET THREAT

Two of the most difficult intellectual tasks are seeing a situation from the viewpoint of an opponent and retroactively re-evaluating a judgment in the light of later evidence. Both of these tasks seem to be imposed on us by recent indications of the administration's new evaluation of Soviet nuclear power. Background stories and planted leaks in the press have revealed that the Kennedy Administration now estimates the number of Soviet ICBM's at under fifty. It is being said that Khrushchev is carefully refraining from threatening America with nuclear annihilation, despite the reiteration of such threats against Britain, France, and Italy. This is taken as confirming top-secret espionage data on the extraordinarily weak state of the Soviet deterrent. One of the consequences of this re-evaluation has been the series of tough speeches by Gilpatrick and others, asserting that Russia lacks the capacity to destroy the United States, while we in fact do possess sufficient nuclear weapons to "defeat" the Soviet Union.

Now go back a few years to the great debate concerning the impending "missile gap." About three years ago it became apparent that Russia was several years ahead of the United States in the development of an international ballistic missile delivery system for nuclear warheads. It was widely stated, by Joseph Alsop, Henry Kissinger and many others, that if Russia produced missiles to the limit of her capability, she would take a commanding lead in numbers of missiles during the early 1960's. This "missile gap" would constitute a deadly threat to the United States because it would, for a period of two or three years, place our SAC air bases under a fifteen minute threat of destruction. Urgent proposals were made for a permanent alert of SAC and the immediate dispersal of planes, to tide us over the period of maximum vulnerability. At the same time, it was said, funds must be appropriated for a crash program of missile building and hardening of SAC bases. (See Kissinger's latest book, The Necessity of Choice, which is based entirely on the expectation of a missile gap in the early years of the decade.)

Despite the truly hair-raising predictions which were made by the most sober commentators, the Eisenhower Administration decided to limit its budget requests and proceed at far less than maximum speed in the creation of an American missile deterrent. The rationale for this choice, it was explained by various "inside" columnists at the time, was a spectacular improvement in espionage and information-gathering which permitted us to gauge Soviet strength levels on the basis of "intention" rather than "capability." In other words, we were supposedly able to discover how many missiles Russia was actually building or planning to build, rather than being forced to assume that she would build as many as she could. The response to this claim was a violent insistence that we were courting national suicide by expecting the Soviet Union to make itself less strong than it was able. Given the aggressive intent of the Russian rulers, and the fact that they had thus far been restrained from expansion solely by the threat of America's superior military power -- both universal assumptions then and now -- it could be predicted that they would first create a missile gap and then exploit it in a series of threats and pressures which we would be very hard put to withstand.



Well, if we can believe Mr. Kennedy's latest estimates, it seems that Russia didn't go all out to open up a missile gap. This of course is cause for great rejoicing throughout the land, but I wonder if it has also occasioned a rethinking of our conception of Soviet intentions in general. Assuming that Khrushchev is not a fool, WHY did he not expend the capital resources necessary to take a lead in missiles? Why did he not act in the manner which Kissinger and others so confidently predicted -- in the manner, indeed, which they are still predicting for him?

It is not my intention to suggest that on the basis of this piece of evidence, Khrushchev is a man of sweetness and light, maligned by the wicked American cold warriors and motivated solely by a desire to live in peace and harmony with the West. But I do insist that the standard American image of Soviet aggressiveness, held by no one more strongly than by Mr. Kennedy, must be inadequate if it has been wrong on so vital a question. The missile gap was, during the campaign, the symbol of Kennedy's approach to foreign affairs. The myth of a death struggle, which he exploited so effectively, demands as its complement an implacable foe, relentlessly pressing on our defences at every point. Khrushchev's failure to exploit his lead in missile technology suggests a need on our part for a re-examination of the myth.

More interesting still is the attempt to view the past several years of Soviet-American relations from the standpoint of Khrushchev. Consider the pressures which he must have been under to push full ahead with missile development! (Consider the identical pressures which Kennedy put on the previous administration, and which in part got him elected.) What must Khrushchev have had to contend with as he deliberately directed investment away from military expenditures and maintained the test ban (which, according to our own military experts, preserved a Soviet inferiority in warhead technology)! And most significantly of all, what must have been his view of the relations with America during this period? From Khrushchev's position, it must have appeared that he was adopting an extremely conciliatory policy. He was pressing for a summit meeting with a reluctant Eisenhower in order to settle the German problem before nuclear weapons were given to West Germany. He was deliberately forfeiting a fleeting opportunity to gain a clear military superiority. And in response to these tremendously important policy commitments, he was confronted with a crusading Kennedy, raging at a missile gap which he, Khrushchev, knew did not exist. It is perhaps understandable that he expected concessions from Kennedy at Vienna. It is also perhaps understandable that he should view America as the more aggressive actor in the Berlin scene. And it is of course not hard to see why he finally yielded to the military pressures some time last spring and ordered the planning for resumption of tests. To Khrushchev, the actions of the new Kennedy Administration must appear as a threatening rejection of the conciliatory gestures which he had made at such cost to his domestic position.

Well, perhaps this is all wrong. But it does raise the possibility at least of a very different image of Soviet-American relations from that which has been accepted in this country for the past few years.



Robert P. Abelson replies to the "American Response" issue.

Writings in the newsletters bespeak total dismay with U.S. cold war mentality, and I am inclined to agree that there are many portents about which to wax gloomy. I am writing in the hope of generating some optimism, or at any rate activism, in this sphere.

First of all, to make my own position clear, I am a pragmatist rather than an ideologue. I have little sympathy with those who bemoan the flaccidity of liberal ideology, for such complaints are remote from the central issue: the prevention of nuclear war. Furthermore, many professional liberals have fallen prey to political myths as gross as those they decry. The two most fashionable myths seem to be:

1. The Kennedy Administration is hopeless, and we are betrayed. The eggheads have been played, and the Administration is really "yegghead" instead.
2. The Mass Mind is totally incapable of grasping any subtle point of foreign policy whatsoever, and is incurably prone to rightist demagoguery.

These myths bring to the holder considerable secondary gain, for they permit (a) the exercise of contempt for the uneducated, the uninformed, and the uncommitted; and (b) the enjoyment of a sense of estrangement, with all its possibilities for the expression of wit, anger and distress. James M. Burns is quite right when he says that liberals feel more comfortable with political failure than with political success. It is affectively more fulfilling.

The fault with myth #1 is its lack of insight into Kennedy himself. There is an extraordinary consistency linking all aspects of the Kennedy phenomenon: In his personality, his speeches, his campaign strategy, his group of advisors, and his base of political support, in all of these, one finds a two-layered entity: a tough manifest exterior and an urgent ideational substrate. The disenchanted Stevensonian is prone to dismiss the latter as a sham or a political expedient, but I think this is a hasty and incorrect inference. Kennedy seems driven by some vision of a larger wisdom than is to be found in the political present (as in his U.N. speech), although he is obviously supremely aware of the political consequences of every move. Thus he conducts many portions of his foreign policy by stealth and trial-balloonism. It seems clear that as well as wanting to be his own Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, etc., he wants to be his own Liberal; but he knows he must be circumspect in the notes he strikes. After all, the basis of his electoral superiority lies among the various conjunctions of the voter characteristics: urban, lower class, Catholic -- and the latter two are demonstrably more tough-minded on every foreign policy issue for which a tough response is available. Kennedy himself rather enjoys toughness, but employs it sparingly rather than indiscriminately. I think he senses (correctly) that so long as there is something in the international situation to be tough about, he can carry off a lot of "tender" maneuvers without political loss. He is a master of the political strategy of "minimum capture," by which I mean doing just enough to satisfy a voting bloc so that they have no reasonable alternative but to support him though they may be far from maximally satisfied. His simultaneous capture of the South and of the



Northern Negro was a strategic gem. An analagous bloc bipolarity exists between the aforementioned "toughs" and the less numerous group that might be labeled Stevensonians.

As for myth #2, that America is inexorably rightist-oriented, I feel that the facts do not warrant such an interpretation. Furthermore, this view is as rigidly misanthropic as the view that the Soviets inexorably seek total world domination. It is a stunning fact of present public opinion that at least two facets of our foreign policy, grossly repellent by rightist standards, are widely (if rather blandly) accepted by the U.S. public: foreign aid programs, and reliance on the U.N. This acceptance is doubtless due to the cumulative effects of fifteen years of off-hand acceptance or endorsement by news commentators and mass magazines, to say nothing of the unanimously supportive pronouncements of three assorted Presidents. Just as the leftist feels that the public has been brainwashed in many of its attitudes, toward Red China, for example, so the rightist must feel an utter sense of frustration at the brainwash job in favor of the U.N. Obviously, the content of public response depends not merely upon the characterological composition of the public, but also very much on the assertions to which the public is exposed (and the context surrounding these assertions). This point is quite banal, but one can get so carried away with the analysis of national character as to forget this common sense notion. Of course, if character and content resonate (as in Nazi Germany, for example), it is difficult (and of no practical consequence) to separate the two factors analytically. But there is really a good deal of heterogeneity in American character types, and some heterogeneity in content exposure (albeit not enough). The battle is by no means hopeless, despite the recent resurgence of know-nothingism.

And this brings me to the reason why I write. Back in November, reflecting upon Stevenson's failure at the Democratic convention, I took heart in the extraordinary nature of the last minute popular effort to promote his candidacy. In calling people on the petition lists to encourage letters to convention delegates, I found I was effortlessly averaging one promised letter per call. The almost universal response to the initial statement of purpose was, "Sure! Tell me what to do." Granted, this was a highly selected list, but how many petition signers were there throughout the country? A million and a half, two million...? Quite a reservoir of articulate eagerness!

These same people are now (judging from the dozens I know) just as eager to Do Something as they were then, but they haven't the faintest notion of what to do. Stevensonians seem universally disenchanted and paralyzed. Cuba and all that. In the present crisis, one encounters fear throughout this group, and a general Desire Not to Talk About It. From the standpoint of effective political action, a total loss.

Thus what is the public response when Mansfield or Stevenson or Clay sends up a trial balloon? How many letters of support did Mansfield get, I wonder, for his statements on Berlin? Perhaps I underestimate the hardy and tiny band who subscribe to the small circulation magazines -- the ideologues who follow these matters intensely. But even if I do, that is beside the point, for I am referring to a massive popular response among people who are concerned but not intense, aware if not sophisticated, eager though not fanatic. Outrage should not be the sole



property of the Right. Kennedy can well use some vocal support for his broader visions.

It is necessary for any popular movement activating widespread but presently frozen longings for peace to be really popular, else it be ineffective; but the necessary public relations "concessions" might make the resulting formula distasteful to some. On this matter I feel strongly: there is no point in another small movement earning popular contempt or indifference. A movement with a narrow ideological basis might do more harm than good by bringing about debates in which the whooping cries of the right would surely prove more effective than the rational appeals of a narrow movement. It would be foolhardy to squander the public sentiment waiting to be tapped by limiting the ideological basis of the movement.

One goal which is surely popular (though by no means universal) is international tension reduction and eventual disarmament. Why has disarmament never really become a public issue? Presumably because its realization has not been near enough to be taken seriously. If disarmament were to become a public issue, it would not, of course, meet with overwhelming favor. In fact, there is a very real prospect that disarmament could become a rather unpopular cause, if presented late in the arms race, in a time of great danger. Clearly, then, the sooner the stronger for the pro-disarmament forces, the better. There is an aggravating tendency for people to be unconcerned about peace and war at times of relatively low international tension. But during periods of tension increase and the mobilization of concern, the range of policy alternatives narrows, and policy innovations are extraordinarily difficult.

To break this unfortunate negative correlation between concern and potential effectiveness, one must either increase effectiveness during periods of high tension or increase concern during periods of low tension. I submit that the latter is far easier than the former, since it is subject to "internal control." The time to raise the loudest agitation toward settlement of international disputes is during those periods when newspaper headlines throughout the land unflaggingly feature airplane crashes, crimes, divorces, and local scandals day in and day out. The Berlin crisis (plus Laos, Vietnam and the Congo) can provide the spur to get people massively organized in pursuit of long-range peaceful goals. If organized now, a movement will get up enough steam to carry through into low tension periods.

I want to stress what seems to me a still greater consideration. The Left neglects to make loud noises at the appropriate times: it also gets bogged in intricate policy causes that do not find a popular response, potentially embarrassing the Kennedy Administration in its delicate maneuvering for "minimum capture" of the domestic "toughs." I have already made it clear that I respect Kennedy's judgment and ultimate purposes. A new movement ought not necessarily support his every move. But like it or not, he carries the world's most realistic and best hope for peace, and to provide a net hindrance to him would surely not be helpful. An example is the outer-space program. There has been a lot of sneering (particularly from those with whose views I am otherwise quite sympathetic) about the essential frivolity of space races. Kennedy's long-range space spending program has been viewed with much disdain. I am sure that in the long-range view, however, Kennedy has proposed his space



program mainly because it is the best, if not the only, means of diverting the missile complex into peaceful channels. The term "disarmament" has already been disingenuously changed to "arms control;" the further step to "arms conversion" ought to be easy.

I have said nothing herein about what view might be taken with regard to world Communism. This was deliberate; once you get pulled into this question you face the clash of basic assumptions and you can't think for all the noise. It is only fair to say a word or two, however. The basic liberal assumption that the Soviets are motivated primarily by fear seems lately to be slipping somewhat under the pressure of the competing assumption that the Soviets are motivated primarily by self-aggrandizement. I put "primarily" in each clause because reasonable men of both persuasions will admit some merit to arguments on the other side. However, and this is the most aggravating thing about it all, when the chips are down, "primarily" gets omitted and all thinking flows directly from an unqualified assumptional base. The recent surge of American red-bloodedness brooks no second thoughts. If a convict complains that penitentiary food is awful, he's lying. Conversely, the tension-reduction school of international thought is so fascinated by the reciprocity of provocation and mirror-image imputations of villainy, that East-West assymetries are scarcely perceived at all. No one has yet uncovered a "Better Yank than Blank" movement within the Communist bloc.

Are all of us so imprisoned by the motive of cognitive complexity reduction that we cannot simultaneously contemplate the Communists as motivated by both insecurity and greed? I would hope not, in spite of the great difficulty of maintaining such a composite view against all onslaughts.

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#### CORRESPONDENCE

Dear David,

My wife and I liked your article on Berlin very much. The last point, about Kennedy needing to make up his mind to ignore extremist and know-nothing critics, is the key to so much. To us, he has given too many signs of thinking he can do all things he wants to do and appease them, keep them quiet, at the same time. Given the scale of effort we need to mount, and its "radical" nature, this is the vainest of hopes. We hope he isn't over-impressed with Eisenhower's success in stifling criticism, because that depended on (1) the Democrats' rolling over and playing dead for eight years and (2) Eisenhower's not wanting to get anything done anyway. This is where a corps of answerers is needed, to give Goldwater, Dodd et. al. bloody noses every time they pull any obscurantist stuff. In the press, the Congress, the Administration, should be people -- I think of Elmer Davis -- whose full time job this should be. To knock down absurdities, admit problems, teach the art of making distinctions, to lift the level of political debate in our society. The universities have been failing dismally in this rudimentary job. Not only are they timid but most academics I know are political illiterates --and I wouldn't exclude a gaggle of political scientists and historians here...



But I also wonder about your concern elsewhere in the paper with public opinion, largely conceived. Isn't public opinion generally unknowable anyway, and mainly a vague impression that we all get from the headlines and the tone of the press? How far, in any crisis, can a government afford to worry about tomorrow's public opinion or what passes for it? Surely in the 1930's and in 1940 and '41 we wouldn't have moved at all, into Lend-Lease, for example, if the administration had been as sensitive to "public opinion" as the postwar governments have appeared to be. Then, rallies were packing Madison Square Garden, and the present day know-nothings haven't yet gotten to that point. Then, Lend-Lease passed by one vote. And I'd rather see an adequate aid and reform program pass by one vote, even after the bitterest and loudest of debates, than see three-fourths of a program pass by a quiet, happy big majority. Sometimes, to get things done, a country has to be divided rather seriously.

Paul Gagnon

Dear Editor:

I have been mulling over the last sentence of David Riesman's article in your 24 August number: "If President Kennedy can look beyond the immediate discomforts of criticism by our own extremists, he will become one of our truly great and courageous presidents who saved the world from conflagration and opened up vistas of international order appropriate to the nuclear age."

Unless I misread completely the article which preceded this sentence, and indeed the entire tenor of the newsletter in recent months, such wishful thinking is in complete opposition to them, to Mr. Riesman's own honest and courageous efforts to analyze the Cuban debacle and the German dilemma, and to the attempts of virtually all your contributors to move forward from liberal platitudes.

Surely if anything has become painfully obvious since his inauguration, it is precisely that President Kennedy cannot "look beyond the immediate discomforts of criticism by our extremists." The reasons for this inability need not be attributed to weakness or myopia on the part of Mr. Kennedy. They inhere rather, it seems to me, in the metier of the capitalist politician -- particularly the politician who comes to office by recognizing, in fact by proclaiming the necessity for large-scale social changes certain to be opposed by ruling elements in business, finance and the military.

Not only is the phenomenon not confined to the United States: we can see it currently in operation in countries as distant and dissimilar as France and Venezuela, in each instance to our own intense discomfort. De Gaulle came to power asserting the necessity for peace in Algeria. Today, years later, plastic bombs burst in streets, stores, shops, homes; a heritage of hatred is being passed on to a whole new generation; the possibilities of democratic growth in metropolitan France itself are slowly choked to death: not because the General is unwilling, but because -- himself ambushed on the road -- he cannot "look beyond the immediate discomforts of criticism by his own extremists." The only forceful action this beleaguered politician can take is one which will



at least momentarily silence the extremists -- such as the attack on Bizerte.

As for Latin America, consider the somber conclusion to the analysis of Venezuela, "the most expensive country in the world," by K.-S. Karol in L'Express of 14 September, 1961:

"It is necessary to give Betancourt his due," an eminent Venezuelan told me. "His position is not easy, and he has to maneuver skillfully to prevent a military coup d'etat. That is his undeniable merit." I bow before this verdict. But I have not found, either from him or from the Venezuelan functionaries, the answer to the question on which the future of Latin America depends: How will an inefficacious reformist government be able to establish the "democratic rejoinder" to the challenge flung out by the Cuban revolutionaries? Can one really believe that the millions of Latin Americans who are experiencing an urgent need to emerge from their misery will wait passively for years to come for men like President Betancourt to regain the confidence of business circles in order to be able to proceed to initiate some cautious reforms?

If Mr. Betancourt is really -- as was explained to me in Washington -- the best democratic leader in Latin America, then I fear for the future of democracy on that continent. (My translation -- H.S.)

The traditional liberal response to the capitalist politician is to take at face value his promises of sweeping social or policy change, while discounting his more reactionary utterances as a sop to the more backward sections of the electorate. Does not the course of recent history indicate that it would be more prudent to proceed on the opposite assumption? Did not Candidate Kennedy promise that he would get tough with Castro, to a point where even Richard Nixon was constrained to urge moderation last fall? Did not Candidate Kennedy, and President Kennedy too, insist not only on disarmament but on more armament, on a crisis mentality, on a multi-billion dollar race to the moon coupled with a massive program of digging holes in the ground against the day of reckoning?

That being the case, he cannot be absolved of the consequences. He is so far from "looking beyond the immediate discomforts of criticism by our own extremists" that his legislative representatives have declined to present a civil rights bill to the Congress in violation of previous pledges (and have been rewarded by the extremists with the knifing of the education bill); that his United Nations representative has committed this country to going down fighting for Chiang Kai-shek; that (in European eyes certainly) he has cooperated nobly with Khrushchev in building a terrifying crisis; that, after a brief pause for the obvious purpose of profiting in the propaganda war, he has rejoined the bomb-dropping race without even waiting long enough to take the matter to the United Nations. The only forceful action this politician can take is therefore one that will at least momentarily silence the extremists -- the Cuban fiasco.

The London Times of 17 September 1961 carries a story from New York headed "SURVIVAL KITS" BOOM IN U.S., which ends with the following:



"I'm sinking a steel shelter in my garden," said a resident of peaceful Danbury, Connecticut. "My next buy will be a fortnight's food for the family and my third will be a gun to keep everybody else out."

Does President Kennedy or does he not bear a share of the responsibility for this loathsome portrait of the American citizen in the year 1961? In this corner of Europe it would seem that he does. The Voice of America's English-language broadcasts night in and night out are suffused with a smug self-righteousness that finds its parallel only in the last-ditch Stalinist apologists (such as the letter writers to the New Statesman who have the effrontery to characterize the Khrushchev bomb-dropping program as a contribution to peace by virtue of its renewed demonstration of the horrors of war). In these circumstances it would appear to me that it behooves all of us who stand on the common ground established by the Committee of Correspondence to rid ourselves of liberal illusions, and to disassociate ourselves as firmly from the ruling powers in Washington as we would wish our opposite numbers in the Communist nations could do from the ruling powers in Moscow.

Harvey Swados  
Cannes (A.M.), France

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#### ON BERLIN

Erich Fromm.

I am disturbed about the developments in the Berlin situation. It seems that the same thing has happened for the second time, namely that after showing a willingness to compromise on the Berlin question, we suddenly called it all off. This happened after Camp David with Dillon's speech, and it happened the day after Gromyko's conversation with Kennedy. During the week or two preceding this conversation, it seemed to be generally accepted that we were willing to negotiate details about the settlement of the Berlin question along the lines of a compromise with the Russian demands for a free city. It was quite clear that Gromyko would not have had the interview with the President if the conversations with Dean Rusk had not resulted in a reasonable expectation of a compromise. Then, suddenly, everything was called off.

I cannot help feeling that what happened is that as soon as there was a serious chance for an understanding with the Soviet Union -- and that refers also to the diminution, if not the end, of the cold war -- the Germans, perhaps the French, perhaps other forces in the United States who are interested in the continuation of the cold war, appeared on the scene and caused Kennedy to change his course, just as they caused Eisenhower to change his course. I believe the statement that we cannot continue negotiating because of the Russian resumption of atomic testing and the exploding of the 50-megaton bomb is only an excuse. The



news that the final Gromyko-Kennedy conversation was a failure came before the 50-megaton bomb was dropped; and on the other hand, in all the reasoning on why we cannot negotiate we mention only the 50-megaton bomb, but we do not mention Khrushchev's first concession, of dropping the deadline, or his second concession, of being willing first to negotiate a settlement regarding the freedom of Berlin and later to write it into the peace treaty with Germany. Furthermore, the events of the Communist Party Congress have shown that those were right who spoke of a fight within the Communist Party, and between Khrushchev and the Chinese; and one of the essential points of this fight is exactly the question of co-existence and peace.

It seems we have now actually accepted the de Gaulle position -- that we do not negotiate, or at least that we simply wait and stand pat and refuse to participate in any constructive negotiation. It seems to be clear that the main difficulty is in what the independence of Berlin means. The Russians quite clearly want to end a situation in which Berlin is a beachhead of German irredentist propaganda aimed at the recovery of the lost territories. They are not interested in having Berlin in the communist camp, or even in curbing the access, providing Berlin is what they call a neutral city, by which they mean something similar to the status of Austria. It is quite clear that this Russian demand cannot be separated from the whole question of Germany. An increasingly armed Germany which has not recognized the Oder-Neisse line is in the long run a threat to the Soviet system, and to European stability, and in this situation a Western Berlin which serves as a center for German irredentist propaganda must be unacceptable to the Russians.

If, on the other hand, Germany would recognize the Oder-Neisse line, and if the stability of the Soviet system would be less threatened, at least, by a de facto recognition of East Germany, then the Berlin question would look different too for the Russians. There could be, for instance, a compromise in the sense that while Berlin is a free city, its economic ties with West Germany are kept intact, and that the major concession the West would have to make is that Western Germany is not used as a basis for anti-Soviet attack, or as a symbol of German aspirations for the recovery of its Eastern territories.

Our position, however, is that we do not make the slightest concession with regard to German rearmament, we do not recognize the Oder-Neisse line, nor force the Germans to recognize it; and on the other hand we refuse to see that for the Russians this development constitutes subjectively, and probably objectively, a real threat. We act as if the Russians only wanted a change, and we do not admit that by our continued rearmament of Germany we have not only completely ignored all Russian protests, but of course also the letter and the spirit of the Potsdam agreement, which is the basis for our demands with regard to West Berlin.

It is quite clear that the Germans have already a capacity to blackmail us just as Hitler had after 1934 or 1935. It is widely said, as for instance by James Reston, that if we make the Germans angry they may turn away from the Western Alliance and go over to the Russian side. While this is unlikely (in the first place because the Russians would relinquish neither part of their territory nor the communist economic structure of East Germany, so that the Germans would have nothing to gain), it also is very paradoxical that the Germany which is described



as the guardian of democracy in Europe is at the same time suspected of the very callousness which Hitler showed in making his treaty with the Russians in 1939. Of course, it is not really clear whether in fact we are being blackmailed by the Germans or what other influence the German lobby has in the United States to enforce the demands of Adenauer on our government, but the fact is that just as Chiang Kai-shek has had a great deal of influence on our Eastern policy, the Germans have even a greater influence on our policy in Europe.

Much as I condemn the resumption of testing, and the 50-megaton bomb of the Russians, I do not believe that these acts are the real reason for our refusal to negotiate about Berlin.

Where does the present situation lead? It leads to continuation of the cold war and of the armament race, and even if the Russians conclude a peace treaty with Germany and then see to it that nothing is changed in West Berlin -- including our freedom of access -- it must be quite clear to the Russians that we do not want the cold war and the armament race to end. Their continuation, however, means a great likelihood of atomic war within the next few years. Regrettable as Khrushchev's latest acts have been with regard to testing and the 50-megaton bomb, the worst effect is that which it has had on American opinion, a fact which he probably completely miscalculated. But I believe that it is our bad luck, as well as his, if we cannot free ourselves from the reaction to his last mistake, if we insist on judging the question of Germany, of Berlin, and the whole foreign policy problem in such a way as if everything were different now from what it was before the Russian tests. The fact is that our refusal to negotiate about West Berlin and Germany dates back almost three years, and that our increasing dependence on German wishes is just as old.

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Charles L. Mack, Jr. on East Germany.

The newsletters on Berlin covered a wide range of problems and details but I believe they overlooked a consideration of central importance in the matter. It can be stated simply: "Is the German Democratic Republic a viable entity -- either politically or economically?"

If it is not, (and virtually every reliable piece of data indicates that it is not) then the removal of the 20 Soviet divisions currently keeping the peace there will only give rise to a new and bigger "Hungary." But with a difference: a geographically and ethnographically isolated Hungary can travel that road without war; it would be unrealistic to expect East Germany, tied as it is to its Western half -- and with Berlin immersed in whatever happens there -- to remain a self-contained, isolated affair. The Soviet Union, consequently, wishes to secure Western assistance in the matter.

An East German "Hungary" without previous Western recognition would probably lead to an East-West war in Europe very quickly, since a) West German assistance and intervention would be immediately forthcoming; b) Ulbricht couldn't hope to control the situation with a German police



force; c) he would have to secure Soviet assistance in any way he could -- probably by outrages in West Berlin; d) and you may now imagine the escalation from this point in any number of unpleasant ways. It has all the characteristics of an uncontrolled experiment with explosives.

On the other hand, a peace treaty with Western participation, recognizing the G.D.R. as a sovereign state, would constrain all signatory powers against intervention in its internal affairs. When the East Germans overthrow the Ulbricht regime the border would have to be sealed, "criminal elements" would have to be forcibly returned at the request of the G.D.R. when they flee across the border, and while the East Germans are being suppressed by the Soviets at the request of Herr Ulbricht, we would be required to restrain the West Germans -- almost certainly by force.

The problem of controlling German militarism and revanchism would be worse if we were to help put down an East German Hungary than it would be under any other conceivable circumstances. Furthermore, assuming all this could be successfully accomplished, we would have reincarnated -- in the form of the G.D.R. -- the Austria of 1871 in the center of modern Europe, and the role played by that country between 1871 and 1914 makes a distinctly uncomfortable analogy today.

I submit that the Western powers should not make "settlements" with as poor prospects as that.

All of which gives rise to two questions: Why isn't the German Democratic Republic an economically or politically viable entity after 16 years? Why, in such circumstances, does the Soviet Union want to withdraw from East Germany? The probable answers require the consideration of some pertinent historical data.

The Second World War took the lives of approximately 22 million people in the Soviet Union of which 5 to 7 million were soldiers. The property damage is officially put at 680 billion (old) rubles, which is just 68 percent of the total accumulated state capital investment as of 1960. Stalin (who is the source of the "more than 5 million soldiers killed" datum) stressed repeatedly at Potsdam that the Soviet Union was in dire straits and he demanded huge levels of reparations from Roumania, Hungary, Italy and Germany to rebuild his country. What the English and Americans withheld from him out of their occupied zones, he took from his zone. A "physiologically minimum standard of living for the German population" was set up, and "only enough resources to support this minimum" were left. Three to four million German P.O.W.'s were put to forced labor in the Soviet Union for from 5 to 11 years. (I certainly don't want this to sound like a reproach -- there's a definite justice to it. I merely wish to point out that those P.O.W.'s who returned to East Germany might find it hard to consider the Soviet-created Ulbricht regime as heaven-sent.)

Since 1950, the additional burden of building China has been placed on the East German economy -- as well as on the economies of the other European satellites. (The Soviet contribution to this effort has been spectacularly small.) Those who have chosen to avail themselves of the much more comfortable living -- and working -- conditions in West Germany have had only to take a subway ride in Berlin, and the steady drain from



the labor force in the G.D.R. has had a severely dislocating effect. These, and about a dozen other factors -- traditional and modern -- have left East Germany with an economic crisis under a thoroughly detested, Soviet-imposed regime.

The deaths in the Soviet Union (and in the satellites; incidentally: 5-1/2 million were killed in Poland during the war) had, of course, a double effect on the population. Not only their lives, but those of all the children they might have had, were lost. In addition, with the country invaded on over a third of its territory and straining to win a desperate war, the birth rate in the Soviet Union was sharply reduced in 1941 and remained low until halfway through the "recovery" phase, viz. 1947. Those born during that period began to enter the labor force -- in woefully inadequate numbers -- in 1957. When the Sixth Five-Year Plan went up in flames in 1958, it was recast on a seven-year period extending to 1965. The Central Planning Committee projected a requirement for just under 12 million entrants into the labor force during that period in order to meet the plan -- even under otherwise optimistic assumptions. Those expected to come into the labor force -- the children of '41 to '47 -- numbered only 3,400,000.

Two steps were taken -- almost at once -- to meet the deficit: reductions in the armed forces, and -- in December of 1958 -- promulgation of the Education Law Reform, accompanied by a great deal of public grumbling. (The current campaign to "solve the German problem and put an end to World War II" was begun in November, 1958.) The Education Law Reform, under the guise of "vocational training," has put 70 percent of the students of the Soviet Union into the factories and on the farms for their last three years of school (grades 9 through 11). Soviet school authorities estimated an additional five million would enter the labor force by this means -- having a deficit of about three and one-half million. This the military forces must largely make up. In 1955 the total strength of the armed forces was 5,763,000; by January of 1960 this had been reduced to 3,623,000. (Deficit thereby reduced to 1.4 million.) By the law of January 15th (1960), the forces were to be reduced by a further cut of 1,200,000, to leave a total of 2,423,000\*. Khrushchev has made it clear that most of this cut must be applied in the ground forces and he has identified "increased firepower" as the enabling factor. But he has also made it clear that "increase in firepower" means missiles with nuclear warheads, and these weapons are quite unsuitable for keeping the peace in East Germany. This requires, and has required since the revolt in 1953, the maintenance there of 20 divisions (410,000 men). It is the need to release these men for useful

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\* Most of the labor deficit is in the enormous undertakings in the new territories and, consequently, mustered-out soldiers are urged to go there to settle. Those ratings and officers who have been disgusted by the primitive housing and almost complete lack of urban facilities associated with those projects have either quit and returned to European Russia, or remained in Kazakhstan -- grumbling and resentful. They constitute the Soviet equivalent of our Armed Forces Associations and are a part of the "right wing" confronting Khrushchev.



labor, and to remove the cost of their support in Germany (conservatively estimated at over 3 billion new rubles a year), that has lent urgency to Khrushchev's quest to settle the "German question."

While the Soviet army has been reduced to something less than 2-1/2 million men, the NATO forces have been increasing. A widespread misconception of comparative strength in this regard has resulted from the annual need to plead for more money before appropriation committees of Congress. The dodge has been to compare total national armies of the Warsaw Pact powers with only those forces given over to NATO for daily control by SHAPE. But the total national ground forces of the NATO countries -- deployed in Europe under arms -- total 3-1/4 million men in 138 divisions. ("In Europe" is misleading -- this figure includes France's nearly 500,000 men in Algeria and Turkey's 22 Divisions which are not technically in Europe.) The picture has been further distorted by the addition of the 800,000 men in the satellite armies. But 200,000 of these are Poles; 65,000 East Germans (armored police, really); and 75,000 Hungarians (again, no heavy equipment). As for the rest, even Norstad discounts them -- and before Congress!

Why then, does Khrushchev persist -- in the face of all these hazards -- in his attempt to extract troops from Eastern Europe? Why not declare the 7-year plan forfeit and maintain sufficiently large forces in the area to ensure stability, come what may?

It is difficult for us to appreciate the compulsiveness involved in a Soviet 5-year plan or a party program. It isn't just the "pride fight" they're engaged in with the capitalist countries. The bloody and bitter civil war of 1917-1921, the millions killed and imprisoned after the New Economic Policy was abandoned in 1929, the deaths of over 2-1/2 million people during the Purges from 1936 to 1938 -- these deaths of grandfathers, fathers, husbands and brothers of today's Soviet citizens have produced a commitment to the success of the socio-economic system in whose name the killings were done, which we who have grown up in a pluralistic society of almost daily compromise find quite difficult to comprehend.

In any event, there has been no indication that the abandonment of the 7-year plan is being contemplated, and we are faced with a withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany when the "peace treaty" elevates the G.D.R. to the status of a sovereign country. How then avoid war, and how achieve reasonable stability in Eastern Europe?

The Western answer to the first question, and to part of the second, has been self-determination. And in fact, if what I have said about the instability of the G.D.R. is correct, then East Germany has a choice of only two stable states: an occupation by 20 Soviet divisions or re-unification with West Germany. Self-determination, on its merits, is still as good a principle as it was when Wilson proclaimed it during the arrangements leading to the Second World War. But the Soviet Union



remembers "independent" Poland's invasion of Byelorussia and the Ukraine in 1920, and "independent" Germany's attack of 1941 -- with the assistance of 14 divisions from "independent" Roumania. If it is true, then, that we must find a way to make German re-unification possible, the challenge facing statesmen on both sides is an enormous one. In this regard, I can offer only a series of pertinent considerations.

- 1) The problem of pulling the fuses on a succession of Eastern European "Hungaries" without creating a fearful threat (real or imagined) to the Soviet Union seems appalling. It almost is.
- 2) An absolute requirement of U.S. policy during the forthcoming reunification of Germany is an irrevocable, determined recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. I strongly suspect that this is intended anyway. (It was a paper submitted by the United States at Potsdam that established the Oder-Neisse line in the first place.)
- 3) While screams of anguish rise from the Rhine to the "Line," the United States will be provided with truly spectacular opportunities to demonstrate -- to both East and West -- a healthy concern for a stable peace in Europe that hasn't been in evidence since the days of F.D.R., Hopkins and Davies.
- 4) I think the difficulties confronting Khrushchev at home, concerning the "sacrifice" of a happy, peace-loving socialist state to the war-hungry, revanchist monsters in West Germany, should not be magnified out of proportion. The sudden complete reversals of Soviet policy, after intense public counter-indoctrination, in the case of the League of Nations (1934), Nazi Germany (1939), and D. D. Eisenhower (1960) provide illustrations of a rather remarkable capability for demarche, to say the least.
- 5) In tackling the problem of Russia's security on her western border, as well as the political readjustments attendant on the dismantling of her Eastern European "Empire," one must examine the merits of many individual pieces of "wisdom": The Kennan disengagement plan (1957 B.B.C. lectures), the Rapacki Plan, various other plans for supervised and multilaterally guaranteed disarmament in the area, and the suggested inclusion of the United Nations in the arrangement. (Although I quite agree with Khrushchev that much improvement will be required before that organization becomes more than an instrument of Western foreign policy. We shall see what comes out of the current turmoil.)
- 6) In any event, we will have a great need for that commodity known as "tough-minded empathy" (in Ralph White's apt phrase), both in seeking solutions to the problems as they become defined and in attempting to explain them to our own population.

September 19, 1961

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George Lichtheim writes concerning the Berlin issues.

I have reasons of my own for taking particular interest in the recent discussions over Berlin and Germany, and may I say that while disagreeing with many of the views expressed, I found the exchange stimulating. At the same time I am beginning to wonder whether a species of conformism may not be developing in the most unlikely quarter: among liberal intellectuals who are, one would think, concerned to promote genuine debate, as distinct from mutual applause and encouragement. After all, different views about Germany and the Berlin crisis are possible even among critics of present Western policy. As an instance one might cite the London New Statesman which generally takes a line very similar to that of your correspondents, but has nonetheless felt able to express some appreciation for Willy Brandt, and some sympathy for the tens of thousands who have lately fled from Ulbricht's domain. It seems to me that it should be possible to take up a rational position on Berlin without treating Brandt as a dangerous warmonger, and without descending to the rather ignoble suggestion that a significant proportion of the human torrent escaping from East Germany before August 13 was composed of "criminals." This astonishing proposition is put forward both by Mr. Riesman and, in his letter from Frankfurt, by Mr. Meyersohn. I am afraid the only possible effect of this kind of writing on uncommitted but critical readers in Europe is to make them doubt the credentials of the authors. The obstinate failure to see any difference between Adenauer and Brandt, and the bland suggestion that the Berliners would be well advised to trust themselves to the tender mercies of their would-be jailers, must reinforce such scepticism.

This is not to say that one necessarily differs from the pessimistic assessment of the West's chances in the current effort to save face. Like the editor of Der Spiegel, whose July 12 editorial you reproduce in your second Berlin issue, I happen to believe that the Western powers -- and the West Germans -- are now paying the price of having maneuvered themselves into an untenable position over the past dozen years. I also suspect that Herr Augstein is right in saying that the partition of Germany -- and of course the permanent disappearance of the old Reich -- is among the consequences of Hitler's war which the Germans are only now beginning to discover. But it is one thing to say this, and quite another matter to imply that it serves the Germans right for being the impossible people they are and always have been. Suggestions of this kind come with diminished effect from writers committed to the Western humanist position. The East Germans are being denied the elementary right of self-determination, and the only really effective argument in support of the status quo is that in this respect they are not significantly worse off than the Poles or the Czechs. Arguments which operate with the concept of German national guilt smell of cant and are not rendered more acceptable by systematic confusion of the terms "German empire" and "German nation." The first is dead for all time, as nearly all Germans realise, though they do not say so in public; the second is an ordinary political entity, which holds no particular menace to the remainder of Europe, and none to the USSR. It is possible that some East Europeans do not realise this; it is even conceivable that Khrushchev himself doesn't. But is one really obliged to take all their public statements au pied de la lettre?



In a more general way I detect among your correspondents a tendency to mix up different levels of argument, ranging from the historical to the merely psychological and impressionistic. Anyone who hails (as I do) from Central Europe and has gone through the Hitler period has little difficulty making up an impressive potpourri of historical reflections on Germany's past and psychological reactions to various unappetizing features of her present, which with some ingenuity can be (but need not be) related to the political posture one would like the West to adopt over the Berlin issue. It is indeed largely a matter of personal taste whether one reads the evidence to signify that the Germans are now becoming good Europeans, or that they are still a potential menace to the rest of the world. No doubt there is something to be said -- faced with a flood of conformist and occasionally bellicose rhetoric on the part of Germany's present American admirers -- in favour of setting the record straight. But when the historical evidence is brought up in support of one particular tactical position among several -- forgetting that De Gaulle has felt able to recommend both recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and firmness over Berlin -- one cannot resist a suspicion of special pleading. And when one finds Mr. Meyersohn casually referring to the Austrians as "politically the most despicable people in Europe (and the most anti-semitic)," it is impossible not to reflect that such ad hoc judgments could with the greatest ease be employed in half a dozen different contexts. Are the Austrians really more despicable than the Czechs? More antisemitic than the Poles? What in any case have such snap judgments to do with one's estimate of where the balance of power lies in Central Europe, and who is doing most to endanger it? Not to mention minor matters such as self-determination? I do not say that it is wrong to question the intellectual assumptions of present-day Western policy. Some of them seem highly questionable to me, as indeed they must to any dispassionate observer. I merely suggest that it will not do to build up a counter-ideology in which these assumptions are simply stood on their heads. The West is probably going to suffer a first-class defeat over Berlin and Germany, and the disaster may well be deserved in that the policy-makers have unwittingly promoted it by wasting whatever opportunities for disengagement they had over the past dozen years. But it is going to be a defeat, not a "reasonable settlement," and it is going to seal the political fate of Eastern Europe for many years to come. To pretend otherwise is, it seems to me, to fall below the standards of candor and perspicacity which your Committee has set itself.

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David Riesman comments.

One of the most difficult things, even for a very intelligent man, is that of the weight of opinion. At lunch recently, a Russian expert was telling me that there might be other interpretations of Soviet conduct than those suggested by the memo of Erich Fromm and Homer Jack, and I cut him short by saying that I wished he would do me the credit of believing that I too was (a) not stupid and (b) read the New Leader regularly. Since one can't say everything at once, the problem of communication becomes excessively difficult if enough can't be taken for granted. For instance, about the cutting of Berlin in two, I feel very much the way A. J. Muste does in his editorial in the September Liberation where he movingly describes this and other divisions in terms of the choice of Solomon but points out that there are few true mothers



who prefer a whole child to a half that "belongs" to them. Not only can't one say everything at once, but of course, one can't deal with every injustice at once. Actually, it's just because I love my country that I am naturally more angry with America when we behave in a churlish, dangerous or short-sighted way. If there were a public opinion I could appeal to in the USSR without at the same time feeding the flames of self-righteousness in this country, I'd be delighted, but I still wouldn't consider it my main responsibility, which is at home. Homer Jack, in his report from the Belgrade meeting for SANE, makes the interesting comment that the former colonial countries are tied by ambivalent love and hate toward the West and expect more of their parents than of other people's parents -- this is a compliment though of course it is also a cross to bear.

One of the things that is lacking when people have no sense of the weight of opinion is their assumption that one has to give equal time to all views. It's not necessary to give equal time to the views the Russian expert was expressing, at least in most quarters in this country, because they are the general stock in trade of Russian experts. It's not necessary to give equal time to the undoubted cases of truly persecuted people leaving East Germany -- shown indeed by the many suicides that occurred after the wall went up or by the decision of the great scholar, Ernst Block, to stay in the West in spite of years of critical opposition work in East Germany -- since this is to be found in many media. A short-hand reference should be all that is necessary in our pages. And at the same time, because the newsletter is read by a relatively small group, so far, at least, not overheard very much by the major media, I at least feel that I can express anti-Communist views that I would regard in the present juncture as inflammatory if I were asked to publish them in Life magazine. And not only as inflammatory but as adding to the general self-righteousness that is not only morally repugnant in many Westerners but at this moment wildly dangerous politically.

Writing from Britain, George Lichtheim can have little idea of the extent to which the refugee question was used in Washington as a ferociously stated righteous rationalization for the most unimaginative intransigence. Finding it such a sticking point on our trip to Washington, Erich Fromm and I therefore dwelt upon it in our memo. The need for this is no doubt less visible in Britain where one is still surrounded by much anti-German feeling.

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Hugh Trevor-Roper writes to David Riesman.

Let me say how much I enjoyed reading your article and how much I agree with it. I admit that I sometimes despair of America (if you will forgive such a sentiment from a foreigner). I have not been there for over ten years, but all I hear confirms my sentiments. And yet, in a practical world, I cannot agree with an English friend who writes to me from Michigan that we may yet regret the ending of isolationism. It is because we need America that we find the lack of critical attitude in the American public, and the power of that uncritical public over policy, so alarming.



I must admit that I have some reservations about part of your argument; but they are conditional reservations only. I do not feel sure that Khrushchev is not an ideologue. I think that great mistakes have been and can be made by assuming too easily (I am sure you do not assume it easily) that ideological politicians are really mere politicians. It seems to me that, for instance, Chamberlain made this mistake about Hitler and Roosevelt about Stalin: both were surprised when the ideologues reasserted themselves. And I think that Khrushchev is a Marxist and does believe -- though, like Lenin, he will appreciate the necessity of political methods, compromises, and recoils (pour mieux santer) -- that communism must and shall conquer the world, either by peace or by way. I think his Leipzig speech in (?) 1957 is very important in this connexion.

I quite agree that if K. wants stabilisation in Europe, then we ought to want it too, and that if we can get it we may then keep it even if he wants more -- more, I mean, not by final settlement but by long continuation of unresolved pressures. I also agree that the permanent division of Germany is not too high a price to pay. I think too that it is easier to say this now than it was: the danger being that a prosperous communist East Germany could become (as Khrushchev explicitly stated at Leipzig) the Piedmont, or rather the Prussia, of a new communist reunification; and a united communist Germany -- the old dream of Lenin -- would really be the end of Europe. However, I now think that this is so unlikely, between the fears of the East European satellites and the disrepute of the Ulbricht regime, that we could now, without danger, renounce explicitly what we have anyway renounced in fact (the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse and the illusion of German unity) in order to secure the kind of stabilisation you suggest. I am less confident that you seem to be (but I may have misinterpreted you) about the finality of such stabilisation in Russian minds, but I believe that such finality, as a general rule, is more likely to be obtained by prolonged equipollence and politics than by positive agreement.

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Professor Dietrich Goldschmidt writes from Berlin.

In principle, I have seen the coming of the "wall" for several years. The politics of the Federal Republic had to lead to this result, at least since the agreements of 1954 in Paris. Only hypocritically or with grotesque underestimation of the sense of purpose and the continually growing power of the East could one speak of striving simultaneously toward military integration of the West and toward reunification. As a matter of fact, the Federal Republic was instrumental in the preparation of the "wall" by rejecting any contact with East Germany and making a devil out of Communism. I can see how in East Germany humanity is harassed, and hate, bitterness and resignation are spread -- relatively little in the officially instigated direction against the West but rather against the regime itself, which has the power to force complete submission. I am fearful about the people in East Germany and know that all the cheap accusations and declarations on our part, however strong, make the fate of the people in the East more miserable.



The more German foreign policies take on a definite direction, the more do signs familiar from the early Thirties become apparent in the West German situation. Just as then, we find ourselves today in a crisis that requires extreme concentration, recognition of others' positions, insight into one's own situation, and abandonment of goals which could be taken for granted until now -- in short: complete rethinking and new conceptualization. "He who cannot think politically with the enemy cannot think at all politically" (M.Fischer). One escapes the responsibility for rationality through flight into irrationality. Mass media like Morgenpost, Bildzeitung and BZ am Mittag prepare the road for a most dangerous, undemocratic radical movement in West Germany by constantly abusing for propaganda purposes the terror in the East, which they connect with the news concerning the beginning of negotiations between the USA and the USSR, under the slogan "Is Germany now being sold?" (Bildzeitung, Sept. 25, 1961). In these cries there is no empathy but only a solidifying obstinacy. True sympathy and justified concern about one's own existence are made into a lewd, hysterical fit where insight and rationality are no longer to be found.

In 1945 Berlin lost its function as the capital and at the same time as the economic and cultural center of the German Empire. Since 1949 East Berlin has regained this function within the modest limits of East German potentialities. West Berlin became economically a subsidy enterprise of the West that was justified as a springboard into East Germany and -- in connection with East Berlin -- a city for contacts and meetings. The rebuilding of Berlin was done in hopes of a reunification of Germany. The events since August 13 almost completely deprive Berlin of its special functions. The higher the "wall," the more is this city, at the border of the West, burdened with the task of sheer survival. The threat of becoming a province -- already present for several years -- grows to disturbing size. The emigration of 110,000 people to West Germany was balanced in 1960 by only 24,000 immigrants. Only the naturalization of 104,000 refugees from East Germany, East Berlin included, covered this loss through migration. The loss of private capital was merely masked by a significantly higher stream of public investments that came to Berlin from the West. A community that is most eccentrically situated and further isolated by its status as a "naturalized free city" does not offer, in the long run, any occupational, political or cultural opportunities for young and active people. The future of Berlin is strongly tied up with the future of Germany. Only if an agreement between the two parts of Germany is achieved and relations of all kinds are initiated will Berlin regain its own attraction as a city of mediation. The much discussed proposition of a U.N. solution seems to me unrealistic. By adding the Berlin crisis to the U.N. crisis the problems of neither are solved.

I see with concern that the discrepancy between traditional political demands and present reality is hardly perceived and almost nowhere discussed. How many people, parties, institutions in Berlin or even in West Germany have thoughts that transcend the unimaginative adherence to the status quo? Because we have no realistic conceptions we fear concessions and risk inevitable atomic war rather than make a tough fight for life. Not firmness alone, but only "firmness and reason" (Kennedy, U.N. speech, Sept. 25, 1961), can lead to peace. But how can the voice of reason in both parts of Germany escape being either completely ignored or stigmatized as high treason? How can it make itself heard



effectively in West Germany where again, and against the will of the majority of voters, apparently not only does Adenauer continue as Chancellor but Adenauer's foreign policies also remain? Hope and responsibility for world peace in the West are presently in the hands of the United States. The U.S. is on the way to becoming emancipated in its European policies from the traditional course of Bonn, and breaking the vicious circle wherein Bonn's fear allied with American power becomes a threat for Russia and triggers off counter-fear and counter-threat. Much will depend on preventing in West Germany two possible consequences, the beginnings of which are already observable: a downright fascist build-up in apparent strength, or an all too eager signing off of the "poor relations" in the East. The mediation of Washington is sought so that people in the East and West can live. West Germany's contribution has to be to do everything possible in order to resume contact with the people of East Germany after the inevitable and necessary recognition of East Germany.

#### PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS

Alex Gottfried and Arthur L. Kobler..

##### A MODEST PROPOSAL:

##### A CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH PEACE

We propose that there be established a Center where scholars can devote full time and energy to thinking about, exploring and developing alternatives to the current national policy, a policy based upon armaments and nuclear deterrence. This policy, for all the hundreds of billions which has been poured into it, has resulted neither in peace nor in national or international security.... Creation of the necessary alternatives to this policy is the central purpose of the proposed Center for Advanced Studies in International Security Through Peace.

Current serious research on international security is distorted. Almost all the major efforts in this field have been based upon the deterrent premise. The overwhelming investments in money and fulltime talent are in the Rand Corporation, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other government agencies. The work at most universities is remarkably indistinguishable from the work of the foregoing. The most novel insight from all these sources is the lame, neo-Kahnian concept of arms-control. This result is not surprising. A government agency, in the nature of things, cannot escape being influenced by the central organizing theme of "the establishment." This is also likely to be true of universities doing contract research -- almost all supported by military funds. The recent experience of Johns Hopkins University is a case in point. In such an atmosphere, little if any work has been done, is being done, or can be done that is out of the shadow of the deterrent



premise. The gains for peace and for national and international security have been demonstrably nil.

There is an alternative premise to that on which current policy is based. This has been called "the radical premise" and was most clearly articulated in the Bear Mountain statement of the Committee of Correspondence:

We reject reliance upon weapons of mass destruction, and the logic of deterrence, as the final arbiter of international conflict.

The radical position is not naive. While believing that organization for war is no longer right or rational, it rejects surrender to communist power as strongly as it rejects the use of mass violence. Such thinking can meet the problem of communist expansion while directly challenging present efforts which point the nation towards war. This position recognizes that disarmament cannot take place in a vacuum, isolated from other factors in existing political, social and economic structures.

....There is no place now where qualified and committed scholars have the opportunity to devote their continuous, full-time efforts to the radical premise. Starting with rejection of the policy and the logic of deterrence and mass violence, an ambitious program of research must be developed...

We see a need for what might be dubbed a "Rand for Peace" -- an institution devoted to investigating the implications of "the radical premise," and one which would equal in magnitude the resources available for support of the deterrent approach, with respect both to money and to symbolic value....

The major emphasis at the Center would be on the search for new ideas, rather than on orthodox research, the results of which are too often arid. Efforts would be directed toward immediate as well as long-range problems related to the goal of achieving a peaceful world. Among the immediate projects may be the examination and elaboration of some ideas already presented in skeleton form, such as those of Laucks, Osgood and Rapacki. There are also many long-range ideas already proposed but unexplored. Some of the most recent useful guides are the reports of the Institute for International Order and those of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

The Center would also be unique in its modus operandi. We propose a setting where there will be numbers of full-time resident scholars, all devoted to a central aim and with opportunities for daily contact, exchange of ideas, collaboration and confrontation, as well as indispensable solitude. The Center must provide a setting which is first-rate in every way. The scholars must have a situation which is equal in facilities, and particularly in salary, to those institutions which would be its competitors, such as Rand and the best universities. It must be made eminently attractive to the best talent available.

Our plan for financing the Center is of crucial significance. It should be supported by voluntary donations from large numbers of individual contributors. The aggregate money goal should be large: the minimum initial endowment should be a million dollars, and the first yearly operating budget should be minimally \$350,000. Both the magnitude of the fiscal goals and the method of financing are essential. The



effect of contributions from all over the United States would be great, not only on our own government and people, but also in demonstrating our peaceful interests and intentions to the governments and peoples of the world. Participation in this fund-raising, if entered into by the peace, church and labor groups interested in these problems, would provide an area of common action for organizations which work separately, on their own specific interests.

The money should be raised as follows: The million dollar endowment -- essential to a solid base for a continuing institution -- could be raised from a few large donors. No one should be permitted to give more than one quarter of this sum. We have personal knowledge of some individuals who have sought meaningful ways to contribute large amounts of money toward peace. We are confident there are others.

The annual operating budget can be raised from the contributions of thousands of Americans. Interested citizens will be asked to assess a voluntary tax of one percent of their annual income for an indeterminate period. This method of fund-raising would offer an opportunity for a meaningful and continuing commitment to peace. It may provide an answer for those who ask: What can I do as an individual to further the cause of peace? While no contribution will be refused, the emphasis should be on a continuing, annual one percent self-tax. Thus, not only will the magnitude of the total investment have symbolic value, but each individual's contribution will also evidence serious concern.... The very coming into existence of this kind of organization will not only serve to reinforce the morale of peace-oriented people, but may even have repercussions among policy-makers in the United States and elsewhere.

The goal of raising a quarter of a million dollars yearly from the American people through a one percent self-tax is not overly ambitious. This amount can be raised from five thousand contributors whose incomes are five thousand dollars per year. Or, for example, only three thousand contributors would be necessary with a scale ranging from about 100 donors whose earnings reach \$25,000 to 2000 donors earning \$5000. Moreover, the idea has been tried -- with good success in proportion to the effort, investment and aims. In Seattle in 1960 a one percent self-tax for the generalized aim of aiding the United Nations was called for through a limited mailing to friends by a small group. Over six thousand dollars was raised in this manner in Seattle alone. An ambitious, sophisticated national campaign for a Center for Advanced Studies in International Security Through Peace could easily triple that amount in Seattle. Similar contributions from only another dozen cities -- a modest expectation, it would seem -- would provide the necessary support. It can be done.

To comment or request further information, write to Dr. A. L. Kobler, 4731 12th N.E., Seattle 5, Washington.

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George Levinger..

The difference between the present Committee and its namesake during the American revolution is that the earlier one had much greater access to influence over policy. Unless the members of the present Committee of Correspondence can devise ways of reaching and persuading a much more



influential audience, we shall continue merely to impress one another, but in a rather futile sort of way.

What, then, does this point of view suggest to the Committee of Correspondence? For one thing, it appears relatively fruitless to rehearse the details that have led up to the present crises. For example, while the letters about Berlin are extremely illuminating, their content boils down to one fundamental truth: The conflict between East and West is reciprocal rather than one-sided; and, in the political world, tensions grow and diminish mutually.

More fruitful would be an analysis of the strategy of communication that could bring this view to a larger and more influential audience. What are forces that resist our supposedly rational analysis of the situation? How can we refine our own strategy of communication? With so many brilliant minds in the social and physical sciences actively engaged in seeking feasible solutions to the communications impasse, how come we discuss it so little in these pages? How can the efforts of the many fragmented groups within the so-called peace movement be coordinated?...

Like most others, I can think of few truly positive suggestions that are relatively new and go beyond mere analysis and discussion. Yet here are a few:

1. A press agency for the "peace groups" that issues semi-official commentary on every important event on the international scene. Such an agency would release statements to the press and radio regularly, and might potentially attain the status of a true third force. Its two major aims would be (a) the welfare of all mankind, and (b) the objective, non-partisan analysis of events in the political cold war. (A model for such an agency is Leo Szilard's Voice of the Dolphins, Simon and Schuster, 1961.)
2. The suggestion, from a prominent neutral source, that all the nations of the world cooperate in Operation Moonshot, rather than having the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. compete separately. Such a cooperative endeavor would save enormous sums of capital, as well as the "face" of at least one of these two implacable competitors. The savings could be better utilized elsewhere, and the lessons from cooperation would be large.
3. What large industries would be likely to benefit decisively from weapons reduction? What are the chances of having such companies lobby strongly (and self-interestedly) against increases in arms expenditures and for the reduction of weaponry?

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Robert H. Sollen..

Permit me to add my feeling of urgency for a plea to Newsletter readers to make their feelings for negotiations on the Berlin and disarmament issues known at the White House and State Department.

I take it several Committee of Correspondence members and newsletter



readers have some influence at the White House. The rest of us can assert ourselves as part of American public opinion.

Individuals should write letters, organizations petition the White House, the State Department and the U. S. Mission to the U.N.; and groups can place political advertisements in newspapers as the only way, in many cases, of getting rational alternatives explained in the daily press.

I think we must let the administration know that there is a feeling among a substantial number of persons that negotiations, mutually-beneficial concessions and recognition of certain realities are not elements of appeasement or surrender.

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Gerald Ringer..

Here is a concrete thing Committees of Correspondence can do in their own cities. Each week, a different member could write one letter to the editor of the local newspaper. The letter can be an original thought, or an endorsement of something that has already appeared (a letter or an editorial) -- or a rebuttal to an idea that has been expressed in that paper. This "duty" would be light when divided among the members of a group of any size at all. The spirit of free speculation will gain general acceptance only as it gains widespread expression.

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Citizens for the United Nations..

Dr. Rhoads Murphey of the University of Washington has written urging newsletter readers to contribute to the support of the United Nations. Last year \$75,000 was contributed nationally, much of it in the form of a one percent voluntary income tax. "We hope that in future years more and more people in this country and in other countries will come to give similar positive expression to their concern for human welfare. Such action will have strong symbolic significance and is also a tangible way for citizens of one country to share with others."

Checks should be made payable to The United Nations and sent to Citizens for the United Nations, 3959 15th Ave., Seattle, Washington.

"The three or four of us here who have put this effort together are an amateur and very much part-time group.... We will collect all voluntary tax contributions and forward them to the United Nations after a significant amount has accumulated, keeping a record only of the amounts in hopes that the total will be impressive enough to be newsworthy and to encourage others to participate. We would of course prefer to send money to the U.N. with no strings on its use, but we are advised that the amounts of unspecified gifts are deducted from the totals of member countries' support funds. This year's tax will be used for United Nations Technical Assistance in Africa."